The Supreme Court's Blitzkrieg Against the Federal Judiciary and The Rule of Law
The CASA decision's sweeping elimination of checks on executive power.
In my last analysis, I explored the growing tension between the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, focusing on the high court’s increasing willingness to intervene on behalf of the executive branch. That tension has now culminated in a landmark decision that fundamentally reshapes the balance of power within the judiciary itself. With its recent ruling to curtail the use of nationwide injunctions, the Supreme Court has not merely settled a legal dispute; it has systematically upended our system of checks and balances with profound implications for the rule of law.
The immediate impact of the decision is to remove a critical tool from the hands of federal district and appellate courts. Nationwide injunctions, which allow a single judge to block the enforcement of an unlawful executive policy across the entire country, have long served as a powerful, front-line defense against executive overreach. The majority’s reasoning—that courts should not exceed their own power even when the executive has—is a hollow justification for a radical shift in the balance of power. This reasoning, however, masks a far more significant practical outcome: an executive policy can now be deemed likely unconstitutional by a court, yet continue to be enforced against millions of citizens who were not party to that specific lawsuit. This shifts the burden onto challengers to organize complex, time-consuming class-action lawsuits to achieve the same broad relief that a single injunction once provided, giving the executive a crucial advantage in both time and resources.
This move is simultaneously the culmination and escalation of a strategy I previously outlined. For years, the Court has used its "shadow docket" to lift injunctions against the Trump administration. But that was a piecemeal effort. The one advantage the lower courts retained was their capacity—they could hear and rule on far more cases than the Supreme Court could ever review. In recent months, this this bought precious time to defend the constitutional order. That advantage has now been annihilated. In one fell swoop, the Court has engaged in a judicial blitzkrieg, effectively nullifying or narrowing dozens of injunctions without having to hear the merits of a single case. Because the Court lacks the capacity to grant a full hearing to all these challenges, the checks placed on the executive are now functionally eliminated.
The data paints a stark picture of the ruling’s impact. Of the 87 district court rulings against the administration tracked in a recent analysis, 50 of them—or 57.5%—involved preliminary injunctions or temporary restraining orders likely affected by this decision. Cases that had tangible, protective effects are now functionally limited. For instance, an injunction in State of New York v. McMahon successfully halted a planned Reduction in Force at the Department of Education. With this new ruling, that protection likely evaporates for any federal employee not a direct plaintiff in the case. The story is similar in the appellate courts, where eight crucial cases upholding injunctions, nearly a third of all adverse rulings at that level, are now undermined.
This leads to a crucial and disquieting question: What is the underlying judicial philosophy driving this shift? Three primary interpretations emerge.
The first is that the Court genuinely believes the Constitution favors a nearly unconstrained executive. This seems the least plausible. It runs contrary to the foundational principle of separated powers and stands in stark contrast to the Court's readiness to check executive authority in previous administrations. Only once did the Supreme Court intervene to lift a lower court injunction placed on the Biden administration policy–and they didn’t do so until three days after he left office.
A second interpretation views this not through a partisan lens, but as an assertion of institutional supremacy. In this view, the Supreme Court is consolidating power, positioning itself as the sole, indispensable check on the other branches of government. The authority of the lower courts to constrain the executive becomes provisional, a delegated power that the Supreme Court can revoke at its discretion. This assertion of judicial supremacy, however, is not limited to the executive; it logically extends to the Court's authority over Congress as well. This represents a historic centralization of judicial authority, transforming the very structure of the federal court system.
A third interpretation is the most chilling: that this Court wants this specific President to be an unconstrained executive, Constitution be damned. Having already granted him unprecedented immunity from criminal prosecution, the justices have now dismantled the primary mechanism for civil checks on his power.
Regardless of the motive—be it partisan allegiance or an unparalleled power grab—the result is a judiciary remade. The Supreme Court has authored a new chapter in its relationship with the lower courts, one in which their role as a swift and meaningful check on executive power has been critically diminished. The long-term consequences for the balance of power, and for the public’s perception of the judiciary as a reliable guardian of constitutional norms, will unfold for years to come.