Measured Resistance: Data Reveals Cross-Ideological Judicial Opposition to Trump Administration

The cross-ideological judicial pushback challenging Trump’s narrative.

"These partisan activists are undermining the judicial branch," declared White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt last Wednesday, criticizing judges who ruled against the administration. President Trump went further, labeling Judge Boasberg—a right-of-center judge initially appointed by G.W. Bush—a "radical left lunatic."

The Trump administration portrays judicial opposition as purely partisan, but the data reveals a starkly different reality: judges from across the ideological spectrum are ruling against administration policies at remarkable rates. This cross-ideological judicial resistance suggests deeper institutional concerns about executive overreach rather than mere partisan motivations. Even more tellingly, two of the four federal judges targeted by House Republicans for impeachment are distinctly right-of-center jurists.

Cross-Ideological Judicial Resistance: What the Data Shows

For the past month, I've systematically tracked district court rulings on challenges to Trump administration actions using judicial ideology measures I co-developed with Maya Sen. The DIME scores measure judicial ideology based on the political campaign contributions judges made before their confirmation to the bench. This methodology provides an objective, behavior-based measure of ideological leaning that's independent—but highly predictive—of their judicial decisions.

The data visualization shown above reveals a pattern that demolishes the administration's narrative about "partisan" judges. Looking at the distribution of case outcomes across the ideological spectrum, we see that judges from various ideological backgrounds—not just those on the left—have issued rulings against Trump administration policies.¹ So far, half of rulings issued by conservative judges have gone against the Trump administration.²

The highlighted judges targeted for impeachment (Ali, Engelmayer, Boasberg, and Bates) span the ideological continuum, with two being decidedly right-of-center. This undermines the administration's narrative that judicial opposition stems purely from partisan or ideological motivations. If ideology were the primary driver of judicial decisions in these cases, we would expect to see a much clearer partisan divide in the rulings and less eagerness to reproach conservative judges.

What might explain this cross-ideological resistance? One possibility is that these cases involve legal principles that transcend typical partisan divides—core questions about executive power, separation of powers, and constitutional constraints that concern jurists regardless of their ideological leanings. Another explanation is that the administration's legal arguments in these cases may be particularly weak, failing to persuade even judges who might otherwise be sympathetic to its policy goals.

The pattern becomes even more troubling when viewed alongside the GOP’s public attacks on judges. Given that two conservative judges have been targeted, these impeachment threats function largely as intimidation aimed at conservative judges to compel conformity or face consequences. The message is that ideological alignment matters less than loyalty to the administration. It's a signal that their shared ideology and adherence to the law will not save them from being targeted; only blind loyalty will.

Will the Courts Save Us?

The short answer: No. But they can buy time by erecting barriers to constitutional assault—markedly better than courts simply siding with Trump at high rates. The judiciary is generating significant friction against executive overreach.

This friction is partly attributable to the current composition of district courts. After the Biden administration successfully appointed a record number of judges, these courts are now as liberal-leaning as they will be during this administration. But the cross-ideological nature of the rulings suggests something beyond mere partisan composition is at work.

The challenge is that the higher up the appeals process, the more politicized courts become—a phenomenon Maya Sen and I document in our research. While district courts are currently providing the strongest check on executive power, their decisions are ultimately subject to review by the Circuit Courts and ultimately the Supreme Court.

Justice Roberts' Dilemma and the Coming Constitutional Showdown

The patterns of resistance in lower courts point to a looming constitutional crisis that ultimately centers on the Supreme Court and its Chief Justice, John Roberts. The current predicament is, in many ways, one of Roberts' own making but not one he can manage alone.

By granting substantial immunity to former presidents in Trump v. United States, the Roberts Court fundamentally altered a key separation of powers framework—the principle that the president is subject to the rule of law and thus to judicial oversight. This decision created a constitutional vacuum where presidential "official acts" now potentially exist beyond meaningful judicial review.

Roberts now faces a profound dilemma—one largely of his own making. He and most of his colleagues surely do not wish to surrender the Court's power to an emboldened executive. Yet their options are now significantly constrained by their own precedent. By creating an immunity shield around 'official acts,' the Court has undermined its own ability to check presidential power.

True, the Court retained authority to determine whether an act qualifies as 'official.' But this theoretical power may prove hollow in practice. If a president declares that metaphorically crossing the Rubicon is an 'official act,' it remains uncertain whether the Court will have any practical ability to prevent such actions or impose accountability once constitutional boundaries have been breached. The immunity decision has placed the Court in the position of having to defend institutional powers it previously held but voluntarily, and very publicly, surrendered.

The Supreme Court now faces a likely showdown with the Presidency where it must attempt to reassert its institutional authority while navigating the constraints of its own precedent. Strategically, the Court may find its strongest position by selecting a case where a conservative lower court judge ruled against the administration, thereby signaling that its intervention stems from institutional concern rather than policy differences. Yet even this approach faces daunting obstacles without congressional backing, which currently appears unlikely.

Courts Alone Aren’t Enough

The data presented here suggests that the judiciary retains a capacity for principled independence even in polarized times. But this independence alone cannot serve as effective constitutional guardrails without broader support.

If judicial checks fail—and without broader institutional backing, they likely will—we face the prospect of fundamental constitutional transformation from a system of balanced powers to one where executive authority faces few meaningful constraints.

One thing is certain: if constitutional guardrails do hold, it won't be because of the courts alone but because of broader democratic mobilization. As recent examples from Israel to Poland have shown, courts cannot successfully defend the constitution on their own. They require citizens willing to stand up for them when they stand up for the rule of law.

I have long criticized the Supreme Court’s outsized political influence—the concentration of power in nine unelected justices surpasses norms in other democracies, creating fundamental imbalances in our constitutional system that underlie many institutional problems.

Yet our current moment demands pragmatic clarity: when forced to choose between an imperfect judicial check on power and an unchecked executive with authoritarian ambitions, the choice becomes stark. Democratic governance, setting aside concerns about the anti-democratic nature of judicial supremacy, cannot survive without an independent judiciary willing to enforce constitutional boundaries.

The question now is whether we—citizens, civil society, the media, and other democratic institutions—will recognize this moment for what it is. So far judges are doing their part. Will we do ours?

1. The coding scheme counts Temporary Restraining Orders (TROs) and preliminary injunctions as substantive rulings against the administration when granted. Though technically temporary, these measures represent significant judicial checks on executive power. In today's legal landscape, such "temporary" rulings often function as de facto final decisions—cases frequently settle after preliminary relief is granted, or the initial ruling establishes the trajectory for subsequent proceedings. A judge's willingness to temporarily halt executive action reveals their assessment of the constitutional questions at stake.

2. Some readers may notice differences between these findings and my earlier Bluesky thread which showed different rates of rulings against the Trump administration across ideological lines. These differences reflect both the rapidly evolving legal landscape (with several rulings being issued in recent days) and my adoption of a more rigorous coding approach. The updated analysis employs stricter criteria for categorizing rulings against the administration. Several cases where right-leaning judges initially issued restraining orders but later dissolved them are now coded unambiguously as rulings for the Trump administration, whereas my previous analysis treated them as mixed outcomes. Additionally, I’ve adopted a single-outcome-per-case model, which prevents counting multiple procedural rulings within the same case separately.